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5.1 Introduction
The idea of fossil fuel subsidy reform can be considered an ‘international norm’,
usually deﬁned as a ‘standard of appropriate behaviour’ (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998: 891). Norms deﬁne what actors ought and ought not to do – respect human
rights, for example, or ban chemical weapons. Contrary to binding laws and
rules, norms are obeyed not (necessarily) because they are enforced but because
they are seen as legitimate and contain a sense of ‘oughtness’ (Florini 1996). This
description captures fossil fuel subsidy reform quite well, as state support for
fossil fuels is increasingly portrayed as deviant from ‘proper’ or ‘appropriate’
behaviour. Lord Nicholas Stern (2015), for example, called low taxes on coal
consumption ‘unethical’ because they result in large-scale deaths and damage to
others. Similarly, Fatih Birol, now the head of the International Energy Agency
(IEA), declared that fossil fuel subsidies ‘do not make sense’ and are ‘public
enemy number one’ (cited in Casey 2013).
Looking at fossil fuel subsidy reform through the lens of international norms
raises two questions. First, international norms are typically the products of
advocacy by transnational networks and social movements (Keck and Sikkink
1998). The fossil fuel subsidy reform norm, however, did not follow this tradi-
tional pattern. Instead, it more or less trickled down from above in 2009, when
the leaders of the Group of 20 (G20) pledged to ‘phase out over the medium term
inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies’ (G20 2009). The very few non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) that had worked on the issue were completely taken by
surprise by this G20 commitment. How can we account for the top-down
emergence of the fossil fuel subsidy reform norm in the absence of
a networked international ‘movement’ led by transnational norm entrepreneurs?
And why did the norm emerge in the late 2000s, even though the ﬁrst calls for
reform of fossil fuel subsidies can be traced back to the 1980s?
Second, the weak diffusion of the norm of fossil fuel subsidy reform is also
puzzling. In spite of the commitment to phase out fossil fuels at the highest possible
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political level (the leaders of the G20), many states inside and outside the G20
continue to provide lavish support to fossil fuel consumers and, to a lesser extent,
producers. Moreover, the issue has been generally overlooked in the international
climate change regime (van Asselt and Kulovesi 2017; see Chapter 8). The absence
of real action within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) regime on fossil fuel subsidies is surprising given that fossil
fuel subsidies can be regarded as a form of ‘negative climate ﬁnance’ (Brende
2015) or even an ‘anti-climate policy’ (Compston and Bailey 2013). An efﬁcient
climate policy would ﬁrst seek to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies and then explore
ways to price carbon, yet international efforts have focused primarily on ways to
price carbon, arguably putting the cart before the horse.
This chapter seeks to explain the top-down emergence and incomplete diffu-
sion of fossil fuel subsidy reform as an international norm. Our focus lies on the
international level. We ﬁrst trace the long history of multilateral efforts to
address fossil fuel subsidies, before interpreting the role of norm entrepreneurs,
political opportunity structures and discursive contestation. A key conclusion
that emerges from this is that the norm of fossil fuel subsidy reform remains
essentially contested. In contrast to the established international consensus over
how to deﬁne agriculture and ﬁsheries subsidies, no common deﬁnition of
energy subsidies has emerged, which hinders implementation of the norm.
The norm of fossil fuel subsidy reform thus follows a broader pattern, recently
identiﬁed by constructivist norm scholars, whereby very general norms have
weak normative power because they permit a very wide range of interpretations.
This often leads to their decay or irrelevance (e.g. Bailey 2008; Hadden and
Seybert 2016).
5.2 Genesis of the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform Norm
How did the norm of fossil fuel subsidy reform emerge? Here we describe the
process of how international norms emerge along three stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, a norm is articulated by a set of norm entrepreneurs. In this process of
norm building, norm entrepreneurs call attention to issues and set new
standards of appropriate behaviour. In the second stage, the norm gets insti-
tutionalised in speciﬁc sets of international rules and organisations. This
happens when norm entrepreneurs convince a critical mass of states (norm
leaders) to embrace the new norm. The third stage involves the diffusion of
the international norm as the norm leaders attempt to socialise other states to
become norm followers.
Our three-staged model is inspired by the seminal work of Finnemore and
Sikkink (1998), but it also differs from their model because we do not assume
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that these stages unfold in a strictly sequential manner. Some norms may indeed
‘cascade’ through the international system and eventually reach the stage of
internalisation. This is the point where the norm gets a taken-for-granted character
and is no longer a matter of broad public debate. For example, few people today
would dispute the abolishment of slavery or the immunity for medical personnel
during war (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Other norms fare less well and may be
subject to backsliding, reinterpretation, replacement and even complete
disappearance.
Therefore, rather than seeing the norm of fossil fuel subsidy reform as
a concept with a ﬁxed meaning that evolves linearly, we subscribe to the more
constructivist position of norms as ‘processes’ or as works in progress that have
contested and shifting meanings. Norms are often agreed to in international
treaties and organisations precisely because they mean different things to differ-
ent actors (Wiener 2008; Krook and True 2010; Bucher 2014). The articulation of
the fossil fuel subsidy reform norm (e.g. determining which fossil fuel subsidies
are ‘inefﬁcient’) may continue well after the norm has been embraced in an
international forum (e.g. the G20). The three stages laid out in the remainder of
this section thus should be seen as overlapping and not as strictly separate or
sequential.
5.2.1 Norm Articulation
There is a long history of international efforts to reform fossil fuel subsidies,
but attention to the issue has waxed and waned over time, and the policy goals
and justiﬁcations have shifted considerably. The ﬁrst major multilateral effort
to address energy subsidies was the 1951 Treaty Establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community, the precursor to the European Union. This treaty
expressly abolished and prohibited all ‘subsidies or aids granted by States’ to
the coal sector, which were deemed ‘incompatible with the common market
for coal’ (ECSC Treaty 1951: Article 4). However, since 1965, given the
severe problems in this industry, exemptions from that rule became routine
(Steenblik 1999).
The 1980s was the ﬁrst decade during which energy subsidies began to be
scrutinised by NGOs and international organisations (World Bank 1982, 1983;
Kosmo 1987; IEA 1988). The global context was characterised by the rise of
neoliberal ideology, with its emphasis on liberalisation, ﬁscal discipline and redir-
ection of public expenditures. Against this backdrop, initial studies on energy
subsidies emphasised their macroeconomic, ﬁscal and public revenue effects,
rather than their environmental effects. A 1987 World Resources Institute study
only brieﬂy touched on the environmental consequences of energy subsidies while
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covering the macroeconomic and microeconomic effects to a much larger extent
(Kosmo 1987). The so-called Washington Consensus spread to developing coun-
tries through the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As a result, energy consumption subsidies were
reduced in most of the newly emerging countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
and several African and Asian countries partially or completely deregulated their
fuel prices in the 1980s and 1990s (Steenblik 2009: 188).
As environmental issues were increasingly capturing global attention, a World
Bank study for the ﬁrst time calculated the potential carbon dioxide emission
reduction gains from subsidy removals (Larsen and Shah 1992). The report
caught the attention of the Group of 7 (G7) environment ministers in 1994,
who recommended reducing ‘the currently high volume of environmentally
damaging subsidies in the industrialised and in the developing countries’ (G7
1994a). This statement was noteworthy because fossil fuel subsidy reform
was no longer solely justiﬁed on ﬁscal (economic) grounds but also on climate
change (environmental) grounds. More importantly, industrialised states
acknowledged that they had environmentally damaging subsidies in place. Yet,
at the subsequent G7 leaders’ meeting in Naples, this issue was not raised in the
ﬁnal communiqué (G7 1994b).
Attention to the issue of energy subsidies waned until the IEA decided to make it
a key focus of its 1999 World Energy Outlook (IEA 1999). The IEA noted that
‘very few detailed quantitative estimates exist of the true costs of energy subsidies’
and that ‘information is particularly poor for developing countries, which are
projected to contribute two-thirds of the world’s incremental energy demand in
the next twenty years’ (IEA 1999: 9). In other words, pricing distortions were
emerging as a key uncertainty in the outlook for energy demand growth and were
hence complicating the IEA’s mission to develop global energy scenarios. The IEA
framed the issue of energy subsidies in terms of both public spending and environ-
mental stewardship. The report received a lot of press, and the IEA decided to
continue working on this issue.1
It is remarkable to see how, from the very beginning, there have been different
articulations of the norm. In fact, the norm has never been consistently deﬁned or
measured. In its 1988 study of coal subsidies, the IEA applied the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) producer-support estimate
approach (IEA 1988). Larsen and Shah (1992) of the World Bank combined the
price-gap approach with elasticities to estimate the welfare and environmental
costs of energy subsidies. More recent work by the IMF (Coady et al. 2015a)
even frames the absence of Pigouvian taxes on negative externalities as
1 Interview with Ronald Steenblik, OECD Special Counsellor for Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform, 22 September 2016.
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a subsidy.2 The lack of a common deﬁnition of energy subsidies meant that the
ongoing work in the 1980s and 1990s was piecemeal and largely non-cumulative.
Most studies were done in the form of case studies, but since each started from
a different deﬁnition and followed a different format, the ﬁndings were not
comparable across the cases. The upshot is that, today, ‘nobody refers back to that
work’.3 The lack of consensus over what fossil fuel subsidies are, and how they
should be measured, continues to fuel norm contestation to this very day (see
Chapter 2).
5.2.2 Norm Institutionalisation
Bernstein (2001: 30) deﬁnes ‘norm institutionalisation’ as the ‘perceived
legitimacy of the norm as embodied in law, institutions, or public discourse
even if all relevant actors do not accept or follow it’. It can be inferred primarily
from ‘the norm’s frequency or “density” in social structure, that is, the amount
and range of instruments, statements, and so on, that invoke the norm’
(Bernstein 2001: 30).
The institutionalisation of the norm of fossil fuel subsidy reform received
a shot in the arm in 2009 when the G20 leaders pledged to rationalise and phase
out fossil fuel subsidies at their Pittsburgh summit (G20 2009). A few months
later, the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries adopted
a similar voluntary commitment (APEC 2009), which added 11 new countries
to the group committing to the phase-out. While a number of NGOs and inter-
national organisations had raised the issue before, many of them were surprised
that the G20 took up the issue. Leadership by the Obama administration and the
wider context of the global ﬁnancial crisis were instrumental in getting the issue
onto the G20’s agenda (see Section 5.3). The G20 and APEC endorsements of
fossil fuel subsidy reform arguably represented what Finnemore and Sikkink
(1998: 901) call the ‘tipping point’: the moment ‘at which a critical mass of
relevant state actors adopt the norm’.
By committing in 2009 to phase out ‘inefﬁcient’ fossil fuel subsidies over ‘the
medium term’ and by reiterating the commitment every year until 2016, the G20 set
in motion a process whereby the fossil fuel subsidy reform campaigners gained
a larger supporting constituency. To implement its strategy, the G20 asked four
relevant institutions – the IEA, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
2 A Pigouvian (or ‘corrective’) tax reﬂects the environmental and social costs (or externalities) associated with
energy consumption. Fossil fuels are associated with climate damage, air pollution, and trafﬁc congestion and
accidents. The non-inclusion of these external costs in the price of fossil fuels is considered by the IMF to be
a subsidy (Coady et al. 2015a).
3 Interview with Ronald Steenblik, OECD Special Counsellor for Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform,
22 September 2016.
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Countries, the OECD and the World Bank – to ‘provide an analysis of the
scope of energy subsidies and suggestions for the implementation of this
initiative’ (G20 2009). Several follow-up reports were commissioned, ensur-
ing that the issue of fossil fuel subsidies gained primary attention in those
organisations as well. Not only international organisations but also national
ﬁnance and energy ministries started addressing the issue of fossil fuel subsidy
reform when the G20 countries were asked to prepare national reports on fossil
fuel subsidies.
The fossil fuel subsidy reform norm gradually made its way into the United
Nations (UN) sphere and was included in the ﬁnal reports of the Advisory Group
on Climate Change Financing (2010), the High-Level Panel on Global
Sustainability (2012), and the Third Financing for Development Conference
(2015). Prior to the UN Rio+20 Conference (2012), there was a huge push
from NGOs to make fossil fuel subsidy reform the lead issue within the energy
goal of the new Sustainable Development Goals, but the issue was too conten-
tious. In the end, fossil fuel subsidy reform was moved from Goal 7 (on Secure,
Sustainable Energy) to Goal 12 (on Sustainable Production and Consumption),
where it was mentioned as a possible means of implementation. For NGOs like
the Global Subsidies Initiative, this represented a step backwards, since ‘the
wording is no longer a goal, no longer linked to energy, does not include an end
date, and is no longer about a phase out’ (Merrill 2014).
Efforts to graft the issue of fossil fuel subsidy reform onto the agenda of global
climate negotiations also largely failed. The UNFCCC does not mention fossil fuel
subsidies even once, whereas the Kyoto Protocol only includes a vague reference to
‘subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors’ in an illustrative list of policies
and measures, leaving it up to the parties to decide which policies to implement
(van Asselt and Skovgaard 2016; see Chapter 8). During the December 2015
climate negotiations in Paris, a proposal urging countries to ‘reduce international
support for high-emission investments’ appeared in the penultimate draft text but
was cut from the ﬁnal version (UNFCCC 2015: 6). Countries could refer to fossil
fuel subsidy reform as part of their nationally determined contributions, but only 14
countries did so in the run-up to the climate summit in Paris (Terton et al. 2015).
Despite these setbacks at the United Nations, a few months later the leaders of the
G7 pledged to ‘remain committed to the elimination of inefﬁcient fossil fuel sub-
sidies and encourage all countries to do so by 2025’ (G7 2016). This was the ﬁrst
commitment related to fossil fuel subsidy reform that included an implementation
date. At the subsequent G20 Hangzhou summit in September 2016, the ﬁrst volun-
tary peer reviews were presented of the reform efforts of China and the United States
(G20 2016). Two other members, Germany and Mexico, volunteered to be next
subjected to peer review. Their reviews were presented in November 2017.
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5.2.3 Norm Diffusion
Over the past few years, numerous countries have initiated fossil fuel
subsidy reform to some degree, as documented in various chapters in this
book. In 2014 alone, almost 30 countries implemented fossil fuel subsidy
reform (Merrill et al. 2015), including countries such as Ukraine and Saudi
Arabia that had no (recent) history of attempted reforms. Whether these reforms
will stick if crude oil prices rise again remains to be seen, as there are many
historical examples of countries reversing reforms. Yet the impact of the
implemented reforms in the wake of the G20 commitment is real and tangible.
The IEA has calculated that without the national reforms undertaken since 2009,
the value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies would have been 24 per cent
higher in 2014, putting the level of these subsidies at USD 610 billion instead of
USD 493 billion (IEA 2015: 96–97).
Figure 5.1 shows the cumulative monthly number of initiated reform efforts in
the period 2014–15. This ﬁgure was compiled using data from the IEA (2015) and
the Global Subsidies Initiative. There are four important considerations to keep in
mind. First, since the ﬁgure counts reform efforts, countries can appear more than
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Figure 5.1 A ‘norm cascade’? Initiated fossil fuel subsidy reforms, 2014–15
(Source: Based on data from the Global Subsidies Initiative and the IEA.)
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once. Iran, for example, raised gasoline prices by 75 per cent in April 2014
and then by another 25 per cent in May 2015. These reforms are counted
separately. Second, the ﬁgure only counts initiated reform efforts and does not
trace whether or not the reforms have been sustained. Third, the ﬁgure shows that
there is a wave of countries initiating reforms, including large countries such as
India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Egypt, which are highlighted on the chart.
However, it is hard to tell whether the global pace of fossil fuel subsidy reform
has accelerated after 2009 due to the lack of adequate and comparable historical
data. International organisations have only recently started to compile databases
of fossil fuel subsidies. The IEA’s fossil fuel subsidy database, for example, only
goes back to 2012. Fourth, measuring energy subsidies is also hampered by the
varying deﬁnitions of what constitutes a subsidy and different ways of measuring
them. The bulk of subsidy reforms reported here was calculated with the price-
gap method (see Chapter 2).
It is clear that fossil fuel subsidies are still widespread, even in many G20
countries. The institutionalisation of the norm of fossil fuel subsidy reform in
global forums thus should not be conﬂated with genuine norm adoption and
internalisation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
5.3 Key Drivers Behind the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform Norm
The concept of fossil fuel subsidy reform rarely came up until 2005, but in recent
years more than 40 efforts to reform fossil fuel subsidies have been initiated. What
explains the emergence of fossil fuel subsidy reform as an international norm?
Drawing on recent scholarship on international norms (Wunderlich 2013), we
highlight the role of norm entrepreneurs, political opportunity structures and
discursive contestation in shaping the emergence and uneven diffusion of the fossil
fuel subsidy reform norm.
5.3.1 Norm Entrepreneurs
There is a large consensus in the literature that ‘norm entrepreneurs’ play a key
role in both the emergence and further development of norms (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998; Bucher 2014). Norm entrepreneurs may operate from organisa-
tional platforms such as NGOs, transnational advocacy networks or standing
international organisations that have their own distinct purposes and agendas.
Norm entrepreneurs can therefore be non-state as well as state actors
(Wunderlich 2013: 33).
The ﬁght against energy subsidies was spearheaded in the 1980s by NGOs
(most notably the World Resources Institute) and international organisations
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(particularly the IEA and the World Bank). These actors and institutions all
contributed to placing fossil fuel subsidy reform on the global agenda. Between
2005 and 2009, the issue had been addressed by several NGOs, including Oil
Change International and Earth Track, mostly from a climate change perspec-
tive. In 2005, the Global Subsidies Initiative was established within the
International Institute for Sustainable Development, the ﬁrst NGO to focus
squarely on the issue of subsidy reform (see Chapter 10). Fossil fuel subsidy
reform was a central part of the Global Subsidies Initiative’s long-term strategy,
set out at a meeting in the margins of the December 2005 World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong. Yet, in its early days,
the Global Subsidies Initiative focused mostly on biofuel and irrigation sub-
sidies. The newly created NGO wanted to ‘cut its teeth ﬁrst on subsidies that few
were addressing before taking on the much larger and challenging subject of
fossil fuel subsidies’ (Steenblik 2016).
It is hard to overstate the role of the Obama administration in promoting the
fossil fuel subsidy reform norm on the international stage. The September 2009
G20 Pittsburgh Summit was the ﬁrst chance for the newly elected US President
Barack Obama to host and chair a summit and thus make history at home on
a central world stage. The idea to act on fossil fuel subsidies was pushed by
Lawrence Summers, then director of the National Economic Council, who had
long opposed such subsidies. It was presented at the Sherpa meeting only two
weeks before the actual summit. The idea was to ‘creatively link climate change to
the ﬁnancial and ﬁscal issues at the G20 agenda’s core’ (Kirton and Kokotsis 2015:
229). When the G20 partners did not oppose to the general idea, ‘the Americans
seemed pleased and surprised that they had gotten so far with the fossil fuel
subsidies initiative’ (Kirton 2013: 302).
Many of the above-mentioned NGOs, including the Global Subsidies Initiative,
were caught completely off guard when the G20made the pledge to phase out fossil
fuel subsidies at their Pittsburgh Summit (Chapter 10). Ronald Steenblik, a long-
time expert on energy subsidies at the OECD and former research director of the
Global Subsidies Initiative, only heard about the G20 pledge one week before the
summit.4 In other words, NGOs and international organisations did not inﬂuence
the G20 agenda through direct lobby efforts but may have inﬂuenced the G20
agenda indirectly by exerting ideational power – that is, by conveying information,
providing advice and identifying new policy options.
The Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFFSR), an informal coalition of
non-G20 countries led by New Zealand, is helping to sustain momentum on
4 Interview with Ronald Steenblik, OECD Special Counsellor for Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform, 22 September
2016.
Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform 91
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108241946.007
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Gent, on 20 Aug 2018 at 15:25:02, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
fossil fuel subsidy reform (see Chapter 9).5 Established in June 2010, the group
advocates for reform through three interrelated principles: increased transpar-
ency around fossil fuel subsidies, greater ambition in the scope of reform and
the provision of targeted support for the poorest (FFFSR 2015). The FFFSR has
organised meetings and summits, published statements and hosted side events
at the annual Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC, often in cooperation
with the Global Subsidies Initiative. The FFFSR group was created in analogy
to existing groups of like-minded WTO members – such as the Friends of Fish,
Friends of Special Products and Friends of Anti-Dumping Negotiations – that
act as informal negotiation coalitions within the WTO or other international
trade, development or environment contexts. The FFFSR group appears to be
largely focusing on the reform of consumption subsidies (a problem largely for
developing countries) rather than on production subsidies (recurrent in both
developing and industrialised countries).
5.3.2 Political Opportunity Structures
Agents do not exist in a vacuum but instead operate in shifting contexts.
The importance of these settings is captured by the term ‘political opportunity
structures’, generally referring to the nature of resources and constraints that are
external to norm entrepreneurs. Particularly important exogenous factors are
crises and so-called focusing events. A crisis situation usually leads policy-
makers to question conventional policy wisdom and thus opens a window of
opportunity for new policy ideas. Norm entrepreneurs can capitalise on the
opportunity by framing the policy issue at hand in a new way (Baumgartner
and Jones 1993).
The G20 Pittsburgh Summit, organised in the midst of a global ﬁnancial and
economic meltdown, primarily addressed the critical transition from global
crisis to recovery. It focused on turning the page on an era of ‘irresponsibility’
by adopting a set of reforms through the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable
and Balanced Growth (G20 2009). The ﬁnancial crisis led global leaders to
rethink embedded wisdoms on economic growth, thus creating a political win-
dow of opportunity for fossil fuel subsidy reform to be grafted onto the global
sustainable-development agenda. The G20, under the auspices of President
Obama, pushed for ‘sustained and systematic international cooperation’ and
a ‘credible process for withdrawing extraordinary ﬁscal, monetary and ﬁnancial
sector support’ (G20 2009). The crisis proved to be a useful window of
opportunity in political terms to advocate for fossil fuel subsidy reform based
5 Comprising Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.
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on a convergence of ﬁscal, macroeconomic, distributive and environmental
arguments.
Another important contextual factor is the international price of oil. Albeit
economically inefﬁcient, energy subsidies provide economic beneﬁts to actors
who consume fossil fuels and producers who extract them. Interest groups that
demand subsidies are mostly well organised, while simultaneously the beneﬁcial
effects of these subsidies strengthen these interest groups’ awareness of their
need to sustain policy subsidies (Victor 2009: 7). Here it is important to differ-
entiate between consumer and producer subsidies: consumer subsidy reform is
easier when oil prices are low. Under low oil prices, such as in the period between
2014 and 2016, the economic and political costs of consumption subsidy can-
cellation or reform are less severe than under high oil prices. As a result, ‘a
rational interest group that beneﬁts from fuel subsidies lobbies less aggressively
for their continuation when oil prices decrease’ (Benes et al. 2015: 10). Reform
of producer subsidies, by contrast, should in theory be easiest when prices are
high, as they were between 2010 and 2014.6 When fossil fuel prices are low, we
would expect producers to lobby harder for their subsidies because they account
for a higher relative share of their net proﬁts due to the lower prices for their
products.
5.3.3 Discursive Contestation
The third driving force of the dynamic evolution of norms is ‘discursive contesta-
tion’. In constructing their cognitive frames, norm entrepreneurs face opposition
from ﬁrmly embedded norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both
appropriateness and interest (‘external contestation’). For example, fossil fuel
subsidies are still often represented as social policy, helping to bring energy
services to the poor, particularly in rural areas. They have also been justiﬁed on
the grounds of redistributing national wealth, fostering energy security or promot-
ing economic development by supporting energy-intensive industries (Commander
2012; Strand 2013). Supporters of fossil fuel subsidy reform counter these argu-
ments by pointing to the ﬁscal, economic, environmental and distributional costs of
fossil fuel subsidies (Coady et al. 2015b; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). They
argue that governments may reap political beneﬁts from offering a salient and
visible bonus to their citizens (Victor 2009).
There can also be contestation among the supporters of the norm themselves
(‘internal contestation’), often on matters of deﬁnition (Krook and True 2010;
see also Chapter 2). Such controversy usually plays out in the form of ‘frame
6 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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contests’, whereby actors promote competing discourses that differ in how they
make sense of different situations and events, attribute blame or causality and
suggest lines of action (Schön and Rein 1994). Critical constructivist scholars
argue that such norm contestation is a permanent feature of any normative
system (Wiener 2008).
The vague description of fossil fuel subsidies at the G20 Pittsburgh Summit
demonstrates that framing an international norm is a highly strategic process.
The concept of fossil fuel subsidy reform was not deﬁned in the summit’s outcome
document, and no speciﬁcation was given to the terms ‘rationalise’, ‘medium term’
and ‘inefﬁcient’. If a detailed deﬁnition had been given, many countries would
have probably not accepted the Pittsburgh pledge to phase out fossil fuel subsidies.
The BRICs group (Brazil, Russia, India and China), with India as their agent,
succeeded in including the word ‘rationalise’ in the commitment (Kirton and
Kokotsis 2015: 230). Saudi Arabia was less successful when it tried to replace
the term ‘fossil fuel subsidies’ with the more generic ‘energy subsidies’, thus
targeting, among other things, subsidies for biofuels. After the summit, Saudi
Arabian authorities were quick to claim that the country’s subsidies were not
‘inefﬁcient’ and therefore should not be subject to reform (Lahn and Stevens 2011:
12–13).
Many G20 countries made a similar argument in their reports submitted
after Pittsburgh. Of the 20 member countries, eight stated that they had no
‘inefﬁcient’ fossil fuel subsidies that needed to be phased out, including
two (the United Kingdom and Japan) that provided no information at all.7
The number of countries opting out of reporting entirely tripled from two in
2010 to six in 2011 (Van de Graaf and Westphal 2011). The emerging norm of
fossil fuel subsidy reform is thus a perfect illustration of the argument that the
institutionalisation of norms in international forums and treaties should not be
conﬂated with the genuine adoption of the norm. The success of international
agreements or conventions often depends on the impreciseness of their content,
or as Wiener (2004: 198) puts it, ‘detail is not necessarily conducive to agree-
ment.’ A broad and often imprecise formulation fosters a broader adoption of
the norm precisely because the norm means different things to different people.
Therefore, it maximises the potential for consensus but complicates the task of
determining what types of behaviour constitute a violation of the norm (Krook
and True 2010: 110).
There is not just disagreement over what constitutes a fossil fuel subsidy but also
over how to best measure its different elements (IISD 2014). The IEA follows the
7 Those eight states were: Brazil, China, France, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United
Kingdom.
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above-mentioned ‘price-gap approach’ in deﬁning energy subsidies as ‘any gov-
ernment action that concerns primarily the energy sector that lowers the cost of
energy production, raises the price received by energy producers or lowers the price
paid by energy consumers’ (IEA 2006: 1). The OECD, by contrast, follows the
‘inventory approach’ and deﬁnes ‘energy subsidies’ (or ‘support’ as it prefers to
call them) as ‘[a] result of a government action that confers an advantage on
consumers or producers [of energy], in order to supplement their income or
lower their costs’ (OECD 2010: 191). This deﬁnition is based on the WTO’s
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, according to which
a subsidy only exists when it confers a beneﬁt to a speciﬁc party, and is meant to
be consistent with the OECD’s treatment of government support to agriculture and
ﬁsheries. The OECD recognises the fossil fuel consumption subsidies measured by
the IEA as an important component of total support to fossil fuels, but it does not
measure such subsidies itself because to do so would constitute a duplication of
effort. Thus, the OECD views its estimates as complements to those of the IEA, its
sister organisation.
The lack of a consensus over the deﬁnition and measurement of energy subsidies
is not merely a technical matter but a deeply political one. It translates into hugely
varying estimates of the size of energy subsidies, ranging from USD 325 billion
(IEA 2016) to USD 5.3 trillion in 2015 (Coady et al. 2015). These diverging
estimates obviously convey different messages about the magnitude and urgency
of the policy issue at hand and what kinds of reform (if any) are recommended.
The disagreement over what should be counted and how is thus an inherently value-
laden exercise (Van de Graaf and Zelli 2016). The IEA’s estimate of USD
325 billion covers most consumer subsidies, which are especially rampant in non-
OECD countries, but it leaves out production subsidies, which might actually
contribute to the energy security of the IEA’s member governments, still the
agency’s primary objective. Economists at the IMF typically frame energy sub-
sidies in terms of ﬁscal stability, which is related to the organisation’s core tasks,
but their estimates also factor in various externalities, such as climate change, air
pollution, and trafﬁc congestion. InWTO terms, subsidies are only relevant insofar
as they are trade distorting because that could make them legally actionable.
In sum, when actors deﬁne energy subsidies differently, they construct different
policy problems according to their value stance.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the drivers behind the development of fossil fuel
subsidy reform as an emerging international norm. Our analysis reveals that the
initial articulation of the fossil fuel subsidy reform norm can be clearly linked to
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speciﬁc norm entrepreneurs. The anti-subsidies campaign has been backed by an
informal coalition of NGOs (most notably the Global Subsidies Initiative, Oil
Change International and the World Resources Institute), policymakers (notably
the Obama administration) and international organisations and their staff (the IEA,
IMF, OECD and World Bank). The Obama administration was probably the most
important norm entrepreneur; without its leadership, the norm would have not
reached the same level of institutionalisation. The global ﬁnancial crisis also played
a key role in turning the attention of the G20 to fossil fuel subsidy reform.
The norm is also characterised by internal and external contestation and dis-
cursive cleavages. Neither the deﬁnition of ‘fossil fuel subsidies’, nor the precise
meanings of ‘inefﬁcient’ or ‘reform’, have been settled. It has become clear that
different alternative framings of the norm coexist, targeting different audiences.
Efforts to forge a common deﬁnition of fossil fuel subsidies, or a common meth-
odology, among international organisations are likely to falter. However, a division
of labour among international organisations may be emerging, such as between the
IEA and the OECD, who view their estimates of fossil fuel subsidies as comple-
mentary. Such acts of coordination could bring more coherence to the fragmented
landscape of international organisations that govern energy subsidies (Van de Graaf
and van Asselt 2017).
The availability of more data on fossil fuel subsidies and on how reform
strategies can be successfully implemented might in itself spur more countries to
enact reforms. To the extent that this happens, the diffusion of the norm of fossil
fuel subsidy reform may come to rely less on the mechanism of moral persuasion
(a communicative process through which actors convince each other that subsidy
reform is ‘the right thing to do’) and more on learning (the experience of others
provides new information on the effectiveness of policies, leading to an update of
causal beliefs) and emulation (the desire of actors to conform to widespread social
practices).
Clearly, the fossil fuel subsidy reform norm has not yet reached the stage of
being ‘taken for granted’. While this chapter has described the emergence and
uneven diffusion of the norm, it did not assess the causal inﬂuence of the
international norm on actual domestic policy reforms. If countries reformed
fossil fuel subsidies in the 1980s and 1990s without referring to it as such and
before the norm emerged in the G20, to which degree are the recent domestic
reforms the result of the norm being diffused? Future studies could attempt to
parse out the effects of the 2009 pledge on the global level of subsidies.
In addition, they could look more closely into the causal mechanisms through
which fossil fuel subsidy reform as a (contested) norm inﬂuences domestic
policy processes; for example, it may empower certain constituencies or shift
the framing and content of speciﬁc reforms.
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These questions show that analysing fossil fuel subsidy reform from an international
norm perspective opens up a promising area for governance and policy scholars, one
that we believe can yield both valuable theoretical and empirical insights.
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